



# **USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER**

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**Issue No. 824, 9 July 2010**

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## **Russian Parliament Committee Backs Ratification Of New Arms Deal**

8 July 2010

The State Duma Defense Committee on Thursday advised the lower house of the Russian parliament to ratify a new strategic arms reduction deal with the U.S.

The treaty was signed on April 8 in Prague, replacing the START 1 treaty that expired in December 2009. The document was submitted to the U.S. Senate on May 13 and to the State Duma on May 28. The Russian and U.S. presidents have agreed that the ratification processes should be simultaneous.

Committee chairman Viktor Zavarzin said its recommendation was based on a thorough analysis of the document.

He said that with the new treaty Russia would still be able "to reliably ensure its security."

The new pact stipulates that the number of nuclear warheads is to be reduced to 1,550 on each side, while the number of deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles must not exceed 800 on either side.

"There are no and there can be no winners and losers here. Both parties have benefited, as has international security and stability in general," he said.

Zavarzin stressed that the deal "ensures an acceptable level of nuclear deterrence" for Russia.

His remarks seem however to be out of tune with those by the Duma international affairs committee head, who said there would be no rush in the house over the ratification.

Konstantin Kosachyov said on Tuesday Russian MPs wanted to understand how ratification hearings were proceeding in the U.S. Senate and that his committee "will take a timeout and will not take any action until it becomes clear what is happening in the U.S. Senate."

He said, however, there was no serious reason for not ratifying the document since it "does not grant any advantage to either party."

MOSCOW, July 8 (RIA Novosti)

[http://en.rian.ru/military\\_news/20100708/159738340.html](http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20100708/159738340.html)

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## **Bulava Missile Falls Under New Arms Reduction Controls - Top Brass**

9 July 2010

The troubled Bulava ballistic missile, which has not yet been adopted for service with the Russian Navy, falls under arms control regime stipulated by the new strategic arms reduction pact, a senior Russian military official said.

The Bulava (SS-NX-30) is a three-stage liquid and solid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). It carries up to 10 MIRV warheads and has a range of over 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles).

"Any [ballistic] missile launched from a strategic submarine is subject to control and inspection regime. This practice includes the tests launches of the Bulava missile," Lt. Gen. Alexander Burutin, first deputy chief of the Russian General Staff, told lawmakers on Thursday.

Only five of 12 Bulava launches have been officially reported as being successful and late last month a special commission sent the government the results of its investigation into the latest failure, a launch from the Dmitry Donskoy in the White Sea in early December 2009.

The new strategic arms reduction treaty was signed on April 8 in Prague, replacing the START 1 treaty that expired in December 2009. The document was submitted to the U.S. Senate on May 13 and to the State Duma on May 28. The Russian and U.S. presidents have agreed that the ratification processes should be simultaneous.

Under the new treaty, Russia is to transfer to the United States telemetric data on five ballistic missile launches a year.

"We are obliged to provide the Americans with [telemetric] data on the [Bulava] missile because we have already started the tests from a strategic submarine," Burutin said.

The general said, though, that the Russian Defense Ministry plans to test-launch up to 12 ballistic missiles a year over the next decade and Russia could choose which launches would be subject of U.S. inspections.

The future development of Bulava has been questioned by some lawmakers and defense industry officials who suggest that the Russian Navy should keep using the more reliable Sineva SLBM.

The Russian military has insisted that there is no alternative to the Bulava and pledged to continue testing the missile until it is ready to be deployed with the Navy.

MOSCOW, July 9 (RIA Novosti)

[http://en.rian.ru/military\\_news/20100709/159742048.html](http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20100709/159742048.html)

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Al Jazeera.net

Wednesday, July 7, 2010

## **Iran Admits Sanctions Could Bite**

A senior Iranian official has acknowledged for the first time that sanctions against the country could slow down its nuclear programme.

Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's atomic energy agency, told the ISNA news agency on Wednesday that the sanctions could have some impact.

"Maybe they will slow down the work but they will not stop it, that's certain," Salehi said.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, previously said that a new wave of sanctions imposed by the United Nations, the US and the European Union would have no impact on Iran's economy or its nuclear programme.

He called the US sanctions "pathetic" and said that the UN resolution was worth no more than a "used handkerchief".

### **Tough sanctions**

Barack Obama, the US president, had signed into law earlier this month far-reaching US sanctions aimed at squeezing Iran's refined petroleum imports.

The UN sanctions adopted in June, among other measures, expanded an arms embargo against Tehran and called for new measures against Iranian banks with suspected connections to the country's nuclear or missile programmes.

Obama had called the sanctions Washington's toughest ever, "striking at the heart of the Iranian government's ability to fund and develop its nuclear programmes".

Salehi said that Iran's Bushehr nuclear power station would come on stream by the end of the summer. He said the plant would not be affected by the sanctions, but Iran's more controversial uranium enrichment programme might be.

"In the case of enrichment and for some equipment like equipment for measuring, we might have some problems," Salehi said.

But he added that Iran would be able to produce that equipment itself if necessary.

Iran has said it is prepared to return to talks with world powers on its nuclear programme, to discuss a fuel swap deal that was negotiated by Brazil and Turkey.

Under the deal, Iran would send some of its low-enriched uranium abroad in return for purer material, enriched to 20 per cent, that it needs for a medical research reactor.

Salehi said that Iran would continue enriching uranium to 20 per cent, an activity which particularly concerns the West as it is a significant step towards making weapons-grade material.

He said Iran, which says its programme is for generating electricity, had the right to enrich even further.

Iran rejects Western claims that it is seeking to build a nuclear bomb.

"We will not produce 20 per cent enriched uranium more than our needs, but we reserve the right to enrich to whatever level of enrichment for use in peaceful ways," Salehi said.

Source: Agencies

<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/07/201077155935990551.html>

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Jerusalem Post – Israel

## 'US Will Attack Iran If It Must'

*Senators in Jerusalem to discuss Middle East tensions.*

By HERB KEINON

7 July 2010

There is wide support in Congress for using all means to keep Iran from becoming a nuclear power, “through diplomatic and economic sanctions if we possibly can, through military actions if we must,” visiting US Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT) said Wednesday in Jerusalem.

Lieberman, flanked at a Jerusalem press conference by his senate colleagues John McCain (R-AZ) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC), used very tough language, saying the words “military action” in regards to stopping Iran’s nuclear program. Most US officials opt to tiptoe around the subject, saying “no options are off the table.”

Lieberman said that “a certain trumpet needs to be sounded here for the Iranian regime to hear.”

He said the sanctions Congress recently passed against Iran were meant to signal to Teheran to “negotiate the end of their nuclear program and re-entry into the civilized world, if that is possible. But if not, they should know that when Congress says it is unacceptable to get nuclear weapons, we mean it. We hope economic and diplomatic power will work, but if we must use force, that must remain a very active option.”

Regarding Tuesday’s friendly meeting in Washington between Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and US President Barack Obama, Lieberman – based on reports he heard from people there – said “it was a positive meeting, and we can say with some encouragement that the relationship between the US and Israel is back on track.”

Lieberman, acknowledging that the past year was a “difficult one” in the US-Israel relationship, said that even during this period “the members of Congress across party lines continued to both feel and express strong support for the security of the State of Israel, and for the relationship.”

Graham was even blunter.

“The Congress has Israel’s back,” he said, “and never misunderstand that. Whatever relationship problems we have had in the past, it has never seeped over into Congress. The Congress has been united in protection of one of our best allies in the world, the State of Israel.”

Regarding another American ally, Turkey, McCain – referring to both Ankara’s vote against Iran sanctions at the UN and its hostile rhetoric toward Israel – said he has been “disappointed recently” by Turkey’s “actions and words.”

At the same time, he said, Turkey is an old and close ally with whom the US has common interests.

“I hope that at some point the Turkish leadership would lower the rhetoric, reduce it to the point where we can try to solve differences in a quiet and diplomatic way,” McCain said.

Asked what would happen to US-Turkish ties if Ankara severed, as it has threatened to do, its ties with Israel, McCain replied, “obviously it wouldn’t be helpful. I hope this won’t be the case. I hope that there will be conversations.” Saying that the Israeli-Turkish relationship has “contributed to stability in the Middle East,” McCain said he found the situation “disturbing,” and said he hoped the US could play an “interlocutor role to bridge some of these differences.”

Fundamentally, McCain said, Turkey remains a secular nation that has “contributed enormously to peace in the region and the world.”

All three senators, who met during their two-day stay with Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, as well as with Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, praised the US-trained PA security forces.

McCain, in an apparent reference to talk about putting PA security forces at border crossings from Israel into Gaza, said the willingness of Israel to discuss this issue showed the confidence Israel had in these forces as well.

<http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=180695>

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## Iran Planning More Satellite Launch

TEHRAN (FNA) - Iran announced that it plans to send a new satellite into orbit in the next two months.

"The Rasad 1 (Observation) satellite is scheduled to be launched into space on the back of a domestic carrier during Government Week (August 24-30)," MNA quoted Iranian Minister of Communication and Information Technology Reza Taqipour as saying on Wednesday.

"There are also plans on the agenda to launch other satellites, the details of which will be announced soon," he added.

Earlier in June, Iranian Vice-President for Parliamentary Affairs Seyed Reza Mir-Tajeddini said that Iran it plans to launch another home-made satellite called Tolou (rise) into space in the near future.

"The Tolou satellite which enjoys higher capacities has been built in Iran and its launch technology has also been developed by Iranian experts. This satellite will be sent into space soon," Mir-Tajeddini said.

Referring to Iran's achievements in aerospace technologies, Mir-Tajeddini reminded that a few years ago Iran built a telecommunication satellite and tasked other countries with its launch.

But when they betrayed Iran and refrained from launching the satellite according to their contract, Tehran decided to launch the homemade satellites by its own, he added.

Tolou enjoys modern technologies, including imaging equipments, mechanism status controlling systems as well as solar cells.

Iranian officials had announced earlier that they plan to launch Tolou by a newly-developed satellite carrier called Simorgh (Phoenix).

<http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8904170588>

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Washington Post

## Sen. McCain Says Israel Is Not At The Moment Considering A Strike Against Iran

Thursday, July 8, 2010

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*ISRAEL*

### McCain: Iran attack not on table at moment

Israel is not at the moment considering a military strike against Iran to try to set back its nuclear program, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) said Wednesday during a visit to Jerusalem.

McCain, who is in Israel with Sens. Joseph I. Lieberman (I-Conn.) and Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.), spoke to reporters after meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Israel's military chief of staff, Gabi Ashkenazi.

"I don't believe we are at the point of making that kind of decision, nor is the Israeli government, given the state that Iran is in now as far as the development of their nuclear weapons is concerned," McCain said in response to a question on whether he would support an Israeli military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities.

Neither McCain nor Graham gave blanket support for an Israeli attack in the future. McCain said it was impossible for him to say whether he would back such an operation because it "would be dictated by so many different circumstances." Graham said he would not support an Israeli strike now because there are "many options still available to us." Lieberman did not address the question directly.

All three senators described Iran's nuclear program in impassioned terms as one of the greatest strategic challenges in the Middle East today and said that a military option might be necessary if sanctions fail to halt the program.

"We will use every means that we have to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power through diplomatic and economic sanctions if we possibly can, through military action if we must," Lieberman said.

Iran's nuclear chief, Ali Akbar Salehi, was quoted by Iran's ISNA news agency on Wednesday as saying that sanctions could "slow down" Iran's nuclear activities but would not stop them.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/07/AR2010070705137.html>

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New Zealand Herald – New Zealand

## **Arab Envoy Attacks Iran**

Friday, July 9, 2010

The United Arab Emirates ambassador to Washington has said he supports military action against Iran to ensure it does not develop nuclear weapons.

Yousef al-Otaiba said Iran "threatened the peace process and the balance of power" in the Middle East and said enduring the initial "backlash" against an attack would be "worth it in the end".

His comments are the most hostile denunciation of Iran to be heard in the Gulf region and reflect growing dissatisfaction in the area with the West's failure to curtail Iran's nuclear programme.

"I think out of every country in the region, the UAE is most vulnerable to Iran," he said.

The UAE, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies, which are Sunni, are vehemently opposed to the growing influence of Iran's Shia Islamic Republic.

The UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait are all home to a substantial American military presence.

[http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=2&objectid=10657495&ref=rss](http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10657495&ref=rss)

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Ha'aretz Daily – Israel

July 9, 2010

## **Ex-CIA Chief: Secrecy After Attack On Syrian Nuclear Plant Unjustified**

*Hayden's comments, published in a journal on intelligence published by the CIA, reflect a view different from that of Israel, which has not commented on the attack, widely attributed to its air force.*

By Amir Oren

The secrecy surrounding the attack on the nuclear plant in eastern Syria in September 2007 was justified only for the period immediately after the operation, according to the CIA head at the time, Gen. Michael Hayden. That secrecy had been meant to save President Bashar Assad from embarrassment that could have provoked him to retaliate.

Hayden's comments, published in a journal on intelligence published by the CIA, reflect a view different from that of Israel, which has not commented on the attack, widely attributed to its air force.

Before being appointed CIA head by George W. Bush, Hayden was a senior officer in the U.S. Air Force and head of the National Security Agency - the main signals-intelligence service in the United States. He resigned last February after President Barack Obama turned down his request to have his tenure extended by six months.

Some analysts were critical of the CIA's release of information related to the air strike, and argued that the main motivation was for the organization to show an intelligence success following the failure to prevent the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.

In the interview, Hayden was asked to explain his support for exposing the role of intelligence in unveiling the presence of the Syrian reactor.

"It was a very complex political problem," he said. "First of all, when we became aware of it, it became very important to keep it secret. Arguably secret, because it had to be dealt with in a way that didn't create a war in the Middle East. And the more public it became, the more difficult it would be for the Syrians to act responsibly. So no question that it needed to be kept secret.

"But after a time, after the facility had been destroyed, there were two lines working - because you had two bad actors here, the Syrians and the North Koreans," Hayden said.

"With the Syrians, you needed to keep it secret, otherwise they might do something stupid if they were publicly embarrassed. With the North Koreans on the other hand, we were moving in the direction of a new arrangement with regard to things 'nuclear,' including proliferation."

In the dispute between the two approaches, it appears that Hayden was right and those who advocated secrecy were wrong. Nearly three years after the strike and two years and three months since the CIA officially released the information, Syria did not do "something stupid" and Assad did not go to war.

<http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/ex-cia-chief-secrecy-after-attack-on-syrian-nuclear-plant-unjustified-1.300844>

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Yonhap News – South Korea

July 7, 2010

## **N. Korea Threatens War If U.N. Security Council Blames It For Ship sinking**

By Sam Kim

SEOUL, July 7 (Yonhap) -- North Korea threatened Wednesday to wage a "death-defying war" if the United Nations Security Council adopts any statement that blames the communist state for the deadly sinking of a South Korean warship in March.

The warning comes as the 15-member Council is debating a South Korean request for a statement that condemns the North for the Yellow Sea sinking that killed 46 South Korean sailors.

After a weeks-long multinational investigation that ended in May, South Korea announced that the North was responsible for the sinking, while Pyongyang has strenuously denied its role in it.

Should a Council statement blame Pyongyang in any way for the sinking, the North's "military and people will view it as a grave act of infringement on our national dignity and will not hesitate to wage a death-defying war to defend sovereignty," the North's Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland said.

The committee that handles inter-Korean affairs apparently targeted South Korea and the United States in its statement released through the official Korean Central News Agency.

North Korea has already threatened an "all-out war" if it is sanctioned or punished for the sinking. The communist country has disputed the veracity of the South Korea-led probe and demands that Seoul accept an inspection group from Pyongyang for verification.

The March sinking marked the worst peacetime naval disaster in South Korea's history and prompted Seoul to implement a series of measures to hurt the North politically and economically.

Despite ongoing efforts by South Korea and the U.S. to draw a strongly worded statement from the Council, China and Russia, two permanent veto-wielding members, have been reluctant to pinpoint North Korea as the culprit, reducing the chances of condemnation.

China is North Korea's foremost economic and political ally, and recently urged the U.S. and South Korea to scrap their plans to hold drills in the Yellow Sea in a show of force against the North.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2010/07/07/88/0401000000AEN20100707007600315F.HTML>

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London Guardian – U.K.

## **Papers Reveal Nixon Plan For North Korea Nuclear strike**

*Planes on alert after US spy plane shot down had weapons 20 times size of Hiroshima bomb*

Chris McGreal in Washington

Wednesday, 7 July 2010

It is more than 35 years since he was shunted out of office, but the thought of Richard Nixon's finger on the nuclear trigger still has the power to terrify.

Now it has been revealed that the highly erratic president's metaphorical digit was hovering even closer than was widely realised as his administration laid plans for an atomic strike against North Korea in 1969 following the shooting down of a US spy plane.

According to newly revealed government documents, Nixon is even believed to have ordered nuclear bombers to be put on standby for an immediate strike after North Korean jets downed the American plane as it flew over international waters collecting electronic and radio intelligence.

The documents, obtained by the National Security Archive in Washington after a freedom of information request, describe the plan codenamed Freedom Drop, which called for "pre-co-ordinated options for the selective use of tactical nuclear weapons against North Korea".

Surprisingly, the contingency plans predicted that – depending on the scale of the nuclear strike – there could be as few as 100 casualties and no more than a few thousand.

A June 1969 memo from the US defence secretary, Melvin Laird, to Nixon's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, outlined a number of options for a conventional and nuclear response to what were perceived as growing provocations by North Korea.

These included a plan to "conduct strikes against military targets in North Korea employing one nuclear weapon on each target". The memo suggests a "punitive attack" against 12 targets listed as command centres, airfields and naval bases.

But in what appeared to be an acknowledgement that the use of smaller scale nuclear weapons of less than 10 kilotonnes would prompt North Korean retaliation, a second option was added.

"An attack with nuclear weapons with a yield of 70 kt each to neutralise the North Korean air order of battle in response to a North Korean air attack on South Korea," the memo said. "All 16 major North Korean airfields can be struck under this option."

The NSA's Robert Wampler, who uncovered the documents, said that the Nixon administration saw the North Koreans as an "imminent threat". He said planners concluded that the consequence of any such strike was likely to be all-out war and so if the US were to attack North Korea it would have to be with overwhelming force. "They were always warning about the ability of North Korea to retaliate in some fashion, particularly against South Korea should the US carry out some sort of limited strike. So the military's saying if you want to totally eliminate North Korea's ability to retaliate then you really do have to think about a much larger and wider strike which is getting close to all out war with North Korea," he said.

While the shooting down of the spy plane prompted longer term plans, it also appears to have caused the US military to take more urgent action in the hours afterwards.

A former US fighter pilot told National Public Radio in Washington that he was put on alert for a nuclear attack. Bruce Charles, who flew an aircraft armed with nuclear weapons based at Kunsan in South Korea, said that he was called in to see his commanding officer.

"When I got to see the colonel, it was very simple. He described the shooting down of the EC-121 about 100 miles at sea. And he had a message, which he showed me at that time, saying to prepare to strike my target," Charles told NPR.

Charles said his aircraft had been armed with a B61 nuclear bomb, a weapon about 20 times as powerful as the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The airfield he was assigned to hit was the same one that the North Koreans had used to launch the attack on the US spy plane. Several hours later, the order came to stand down.

Although there is no documentary evidence that precisely confirms what Charles said, the memos note that "USAF tactical fighters armed with nuclear weapons are on 15-minute alert in ROK [South Korea] to strike airfields in North Korea".

Wampler said: "It's very possible that Nixon ordered this option available right after the plane was shot down but then very quickly decided not to go that route."

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/07/nixon-north-korea-nuclear-strike>

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Buenos Aires Herald – Argentina  
Friday, July 9, 2010

## **UN Statement 'Bodes Well' For N.Korea Nuclear Talks**

The UN Security Council's likely adoption of a statement on the sinking of a South Korean warship without blaming the North could shift the focus to nuclear disarmament talks aimed at reining in Pyongyang.

The conclusion of a month-long diplomacy orchestrated by South Korea and the United States with a council president's statement will also likely mean the leveling off of tension fueled by threats of war on the Korean peninsula.

Diplomats at the UN said a draft statement circulated on Thursday by the United States condemned what it called an attack leading to the sinking of the Cheonan, which killed 46 South Korean sailors, but stopped short of blaming North Korea.

"This bodes well for the six-party talks, in the way the wording stresses peace and security in Northeast Asia," said Baek Seung-joo of the state-affiliated Korea Institute for Defense Analyses in Seoul.

South Korea had hoped to see the council adopt a new resolution with binding sanctions imposed on its neighbor as punishment for what it sees as a torpedo attack launched from a submarine that intruded into disputed waters.

The draft has been approved by the five permanent council members, including Pyongyang's ally China, and will likely be put to a vote when its 15 member states meet again on Friday at 1330 GMT, UN officials said.

South Korea, Japan and the United States already have sanctions in place aimed at punishing the North for the sinking of the corvette and Seoul may impose more.

North Korea denies it was involved in any way, saying the accusation is a fabrication by South Korea aimed at politically damaging Pyongyang.

In a turnabout, the North proposed on Friday to hold military talks with the United States on Tuesday to discuss the ship's sinking. Analysts have said the North would eventually try to talk its way out of the stalemate.

The Security Council statement reflected the pattern of diplomacy taken by China and Russia that was often based on self-interest over what other states considered hard facts, Baek said.

"China's interest in this case was to check US control over the Korea issue," he said.

The six-way talks by the two Koreas, the United States, Japan and Russia and hosted by China have been stalled since late 2007 when North Korea said they were over.

A core agreement to compensate Pyongyang in return for moves to end its nuclear programme appeared to lose any relevance as the North tested a long-range missile and set off a nuclear device in 2009, drawing more UN sanctions.

Analysts said those sanctions squeezed the North's failed economy deeper into hardship and drove Pyongyang's leaders to take provocative actions to divert attention from domestic woes and boost the stakes for disarmament talks.

"As long as Kim Jong-il's 'military-first policy' is in place, we can't rule out the possibility of a second and third Cheonan incident," said Ha Young-sun, international relations professor at the Seoul National University.

<http://www.buenosairesherald.com/BreakingNews/View/38799>

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Japan Times – Japan  
Friday, July 9, 2010

## **Washington Refused To Pull Okinawa Nukes Before Reversion**

Kyodo News

The United States resisted the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa before Tokyo and Washington agreed in 1969 on the prefecture's reversion to Japan, insisting nuclear capabilities were necessary to deter North Korea, newly declassified Japanese diplomatic documents showed Wednesday.

The papers confirmed the U.S. stance on removing nuclear weapons from U.S. bases in Okinawa, which has been widely known. The two countries agreed in November 1969 on the return of Okinawa to Japan without nuclear weapons.

The records apparently showcase the initial strategy of Washington to retain bases in Okinawa by underlining the significance of deterrence. Okinawa returned to Japanese sovereignty in 1972.

The minutes of a meeting between Foreign Minister Takeo Miki and U.S. Ambassador to Japan Alexis Johnson on May 27, 1968, and other diplomatic records showed the envoy warned that Pyongyang had been monitoring the U.S. capability to strike back at it and that the nuclear capabilities were needed to maintain its power.

Johnson told Miki that if the communists learned that Japan and the United States made it clear in their agreement to remove nuclear weapons from Okinawa, it would undermine deterrence, according to the documents.

The ambassador responded to a question by Miki about the possible detrimental impact on the security situation in the Far East in the event that nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the prefecture.

The minister pointed out that the nation's general public were "overwhelmingly in favor of realizing the reversion of Okinawa without nuclear weapons" and asked the envoy whether it would cause any problems from the military and technical standpoints.

Richard Nixon, who assumed the presidency in January 1969, agreed with Prime Minister Eisaku Sato that November on the return of Okinawa without atomic weapons.

<http://search.japantimes.co.jp/rss/nn20100709a6.html>

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

## **Russia Denies Working On Missile Defense Deal With U.S.**

8 July 2010

Neither the Russian Defense Ministry nor the General Staff is drafting a new missile defense pact with the United States, a senior military official said on Thursday.

Some Russian media outlets reported that the Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry were working on a Russian-U.S. missile defense agreement.

Lt. Gen. Alexander Burutin, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, said a missile defense document was "not on our agenda" because not even the outline of a new deal has been defined.

"Missile defense is a subject for discussion with the Americans. We will watch their comments and we will cooperate with them on regional missile defense," he said after a meeting of the State Duma Defense Committee.

The committee advised earlier in the day the lower house of the Russian parliament to ratify the new strategic arms reduction deal with the U.S.

It was not immediately clear whether Burutin was referring to a new treaty to replace the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty on the limitation of ABM systems. Signed in 1972, it was in force for the next thirty years until the United States unilaterally withdrew from it in June 2002.

Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute for North American Studies, earlier said Russia and the United States had failed to reach a separate missile defense deal.

"It will not be possible to sign such a document and that task was not part of the new strategic arms reduction treaty," he said.

The treaty was signed on April 8 in Prague, replacing the START 1 treaty that expired in December 2009. The document was submitted to the U.S. Senate on May 13 and to the State Duma on May 28. The Russian and U.S. presidents have agreed that the ratification processes should be simultaneous.

The new pact stipulates that the number of nuclear warheads is to be reduced to 1,550 on each side, while the number of deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles must not exceed 800 on either side.

Moscow has been concerned by U.S. plans to build a missile shield in Central Europe. Russia's Foreign Ministry said on Tuesday there are no threats for Europe that would justify the deployment of a missile defense system near Russian borders.

On July 3 in Krakow, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski witnessed the signing of a protocol amending a Bush-era deal between the United States and Poland on the deployment of elements of a missile shield in Poland.

Poland will now host a temporary U.S. military base near the Polish town of Morąg, just 80 km (50 miles) from the Russian border. U.S. troops will be deployed to train Polish forces at the site until 2012, when the base is expected to become permanent.

Moscow has said it "does not understand the logic" behind the decision to open the base and has expressed concern over its proximity to Russia.

The United States is also in talks with Bulgaria and Romania on deploying elements of a missile shield on their territories from 2015.

MOSCOW, July 8 (RIA Novosti)

<http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100708/159739646.html>

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The Examiner

## **Combating Nuclear Smuggling Falls Short, According To Report**

July 7, 2010

By Jim Kouri - Law Enforcement Examiner

In April 2005, a Presidential Directive established the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office within the Department of Homeland Security to enhance and coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to combat nuclear smuggling abroad and domestically.

The DNDO was directed to develop, in coordination with the departments of Defense, Energy, and State, an enhanced global nuclear detection system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities. (DNDO refers to this system as an architecture.) DNDO is to implement the domestic portion of the architecture.

Federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings, and DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection strategies along other pathways.

Over the past 7 years, the Government Accountability Office has issued numerous recommendations on nuclear or radiological detection to the Secretary of Homeland Security, most recently in January 2009.

DHS has made significant progress in both deploying radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo and conveyances entering the United States through fixed land and sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials since GAO's 2006 report.

While DHS reports it scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the United States through land borders and major seaports, it has made less progress scanning for radiation in railcars entering the United States from Canada and Mexico; in international air cargo; and for international commercial aviation aircraft, passengers, or baggage.

DHS efforts to prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials into the United States through gaps DNDO identified in developing the nuclear detection architecture remain largely developmental since GAO's 2009 report. The gaps DHS identified include land border areas between ports of entry into the United States, international general aviation, and small maritime craft such as recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels.

These gaps are important because of their size, volume of traffic, and the difficulty of deploying available radiological and nuclear detection technologies. DHS's actions to address these gaps consist primarily of efforts to develop, test, and deploy radiation detection equipment; conduct studies or analyses to identify and address particular threats or gaps; develop new procedures to guide scanning for radiation; and develop and learn from pilot programs.

DHS does not yet have a strategic plan for the global nuclear detection architecture, but DHS officials said they began working on a plan earlier this year and expect to complete it by fall 2010 -- 2 years after GAO last recommended this to DNDO -- and more than 7 years after analysts first identified the need for a comprehensive plan in October 2002.

The lack of a strategic plan has limited DHS's efforts to complete such an architecture, because although each agency with a role in combating nuclear smuggling has its own planning documents, without an overarching strategic plan, it is difficult to address the gaps and move to a more comprehensive global nuclear detection strategy.

DNDO's 4-year effort to develop an advanced radiation detection monitor is an example of the consequences of not having a strategic plan and not reaching consensus on such a plan with other federal agencies. In GAO's view, the proposed deployment of this monitor distracted DNDO from its mission to fully deploy the architecture and close the gaps it identified.

Also, in 2006 GAO recommended that the decision to deploy this monitor be based on an analysis of both benefits and costs -- which GAO later estimated at over \$2 billion -- and a determination of whether any additional detection capability provided by the monitor was worth its additional cost. DNDO proceeded with advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) testing without fully completing such an analysis.

Further, DNDO focused this monitor deployment effort on replacing components of the architecture where a radiation detection system was already in place--at established ports of entry -- and shifting its focus away from closing the gaps it identified in the architecture.

*Jim Kouri, CPP is currently fifth vice-president of the National Association of Chiefs of Police and he's a columnist for The Examiner (examiner.com) and New Media Alliance (thenma.org). He's former chief at a New York City housing project in Washington Heights nicknamed "Crack City" by reporters covering the drug war in the 1980s. In addition, he served as director of public safety at a New Jersey university and director of security for several major organizations. He's also served on the National Drug Task Force and trained police and security officers throughout the country.*

<http://www.examiner.com/x-2684-Law-Enforcement-Examiner~y2010m7d7-Combating-nuclear-smuggling-falls-short-according-to-report>

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Global Security Newswire

## **U.S. Reaches Chemical Weapons Disposal Milestone**

Wednesday, July 7, 2010

By Chris Schneidmiller

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. Army announced yesterday it had eliminated 75 percent of the nation's stockpile of chemical warfare materials and remained on track to meet the demilitarization deadline set by an international nonproliferation treaty (see *GSN*, June 21).

The Army Chemical Materials Agency is charged with destroying 28,350 tons of materials, mostly mustard blister agent and the nerve agents VX and sarin. As of July 1, it had incinerated or chemically neutralized 22,958 tons of material and destroyed more than 2.1 million munitions.

Ultimately the Army agency will be responsible for eliminating 90 percent of the total U.S. arsenal. Disposal of the remaining 10 percent of the original declared 31,500-ton U.S. stockpile falls to another Defense Department office, the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program.

The United States is required to eradicate the decades-old arsenal by April 2012 as a member state to the Chemical Weapons Convention. It was one of seven nations -- alongside Albania, India, Iraq, Libya, Russia and South Korea - - to join the pact while in possession of banned weapons agents.

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which monitors nations' compliance with the convention, "welcomes the achievement of this important milestone and the continued steady progress in the destruction of U.S. chemical weapon stockpiles," spokesman Michael Luhan said in a statement to *Global Security Newswire*. "This is further evidence that eliminating all chemical weapons under a strict verification regime is an attainable goal," he added.

Member nations were originally ordered to complete demilitarization operations by April 2007, but most states received extensions of up to five years. Albania, India and South Korea are now rid of their stockpiles, while work continues in Russia and the United States. The elimination process has yet to begin in Iraq and Libya.

Defense officials for years have acknowledged the United States would still be holding chemical weapons when the extended deadline arrives less than two years from now. At issue are the planned ACWA disposal sites at Pueblo, Colo., and Blue Grass, Ky., where preparations have been slowed by funding fluctuations and other setbacks.

Washington in recent years has increased funding for the program in hopes of expediting construction of the Pueblo and Blue Grass neutralization plants, which are now respectively expected to finish off their stockpiles in 2017 and 2021. Latest budget figures indicate the Pentagon intends over the next five budget years to spend on average more than \$500 million annually on the effort (see *GSN*, May 7).

"Reaching the 75 percent mark is an important milestone on the road to elimination of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, but there are few grounds for self-congratulation or complacency," chemical-weapon expert Jonathan Tucker, a senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, stated by e-mail. "Because of delays in building the last two CW destruction facilities at Blue Grass, Ky., and Pueblo, Colo., the Army does not expect to complete destruction until nine years after the April 2012 deadline specified in the CWC. Additional resources are needed to speed up the process and avoid a planned two-year hiatus during which no weapons will be destroyed."

Issue expert Paul Walker, of the environmental organization Global Green USA, also noted the "enormous costs" and "environmental and technical problems" facing disposal activities in Russia and the United States, which together held about 96 percent of the known global amounts of chemical warfare materials.

Moscow only last week acknowledged that it expected to completely dispatch its 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents three years past the deadline (see *GSN*, June 30).

"Both major possessor countries must continue to keep their eye on the prize -- the complete, safe, and verified demilitarization of their total stockpiles," Walker said in a press release.

The U.S. Army, though, does expect to complete its own disposal efforts before the end of next year at its four remaining incineration plants in Alabama, Arkansas, Oregon and Utah.

"Right now it is valid to say we are highly confident of meeting 2012 for 90 percent of the U.S. stockpile," CMA spokesman Greg Mahall said during an interview today.

Apart from a small amount of tabun stored at the Deseret Chemical Depot in Utah, the Army has eliminated all nerve agents stored at the four installations. Disposal operations continue for the facilities' mustard agent stocks.

The Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas is expected to complete disarmament activities of its stockpile in December of this year, having by this week destroyed 82 percent of 3,850 tons of material.

The Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility has destroyed roughly 90 percent of the original 13,600-ton stockpile at the Utah depot and is projected to finish operations in October 2011, Mahall said. That is the same anticipated final month of work at the Anniston Army Depot in Alabama, which as of last week had eliminated nearly 75 percent of its 2,250-ton stockpile.

The Army would wrap up its side of the chemical disposal project in December 2011 at the Umatilla Chemical Depot, which through last Wednesday had burned off more than 45 percent of its 3,700-ton stockpile.

Operations to date have reduced the threat posed by storage of the Army stockpile by 94 percent, according to a CMA press release. That comes from elimination of the more-volatile nerve agents and of intact rockets that once held the material, Mahall said.

"The real risk is when the weapons are in storage," he said. "The more agent we destroy, the more you reduce the risk."

The Army now expects to spend \$24 billion on its chemical disarmament effort, a reduction from a previous estimate of \$27 billion, Mahall said.

The total U.S. expense is likely to be between \$35 billion and \$40 billion, Walker told *GSN* by e-mail.

[http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\\_20100707\\_7289.php](http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100707_7289.php)

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Washington Post  
OPINION

## **New START Is No Mistake**

By Steven Pifer and Strobe Talbott  
Wednesday, July 7, 2010

Mitt Romney's criticism of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) ["Obama's worst foreign mistake," op-ed, July 6] raises several concerns about the agreement and its impact. A close reading of the treaty and understanding of its terms, however, should assuage most concerns.

Massachusetts' former governor asserts that the treaty "impedes missile defense." In fact, the preamble notes the relationship between offense and defense, a strategic reality that has been recognized for more than 40 years, but the preamble limits nothing. New START's only constraint on missile defense appears in Article V, which bans placing missile defense interceptors in converted intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos or on missile-carrying submarines. This prohibits the United States from doing something the Defense Department does not want to do in any case. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly, head of the Missile Defense Agency, testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 16 that, if he needs more missile defense interceptors, it would be simpler and cheaper -- \$20 million less -- to build new silos rather than convert ICBM silos.

Romney expresses concern that Russia reserved the right "to walk away from the treaty" if the United States expands its missile defenses. Every significant arms control treaty since SALT I, signed by President Richard Nixon, has contained a provision allowing a party to withdraw if it considers its supreme interests jeopardized. When

signing the 1991 START Treaty, Moscow made a similar unilateral statement expressing concern about U.S. missile defense plans; Moscow did nothing when the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 in order to develop new missile defenses.

Contrary to Romney's assertion that the treaty "empowers a Bilateral Consultative Commission with broad latitude to amend the treaty with specific reference to missile defense," New START does no such thing. The treaty provides for a Bilateral Consultative Commission to promote implementation of the agreement. Article XV permits that body to make changes to the treaty's protocol "that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under this Treaty." Part Six of the treaty protocol says the commission shall discuss how to distinguish missile defense interceptors and launchers from missiles and launchers limited by the treaty. This language does not limit missile defense.

Romney claims that New START has loopholes that favor Russia and notes that the treaty does not specifically mention rail-based ICBMs or ICBM launchers. Russia phased those systems out of its arsenal several years ago, and the factory that built rail-based ICBMs in Soviet times is located in what is now Ukraine. Were the Russians to resurrect a rail-mobile system -- Romney does not substantiate the "reports of growing [Russian] interest in rail-mobile ICBMs" that he cites -- New START's definitions of ICBMs and ICBM launchers would capture those systems under the treaty's limits.

Romney complains that New START attributes each bomber as carrying one warhead when bombers can carry more nuclear weapons. This reflects a long-standing U.S. desire for preferential treatment for bombers, given that their long flight times make them unsuitable for a first strike. Bombers, moreover, have traditionally been an area of U.S. strategic advantage. Just try to find a U.S. Air Force general who would willingly swap the U.S. force of B-52, B-1 and B-2 bombers for the Russian force of Bear and Blackjack bombers.

Regarding the charge that New START does not prohibit ICBMs on heavy bombers: There is no evidence that the Russians plan to put ICBMs on bombers, perhaps because no bomber in the Russian inventory can carry an ICBM.

Romney asserts that the United States will have to "drastically reduce" its number of missiles and bombers. In fact, the United States will have to cut about 130 deployed strategic missiles and bombers to reach the treaty's limit of 700 deployed systems. U.S. strategic forces are then likely to have an advantage of 100 to 200 deployed missiles and bombers over Russia's post-treaty force.

Romney is correct that New START does not limit tactical nuclear weapons, where Russia has a significant numerical advantage. But U.S. allies -- those most directly threatened by Russian tactical nuclear weapons -- support the treaty. The Obama administration has made clear its intent to negotiate limits on tactical nuclear weapons in the next round; nothing suggests that a Senate refusal to ratify New START would make that negotiation any easier.

The New START treaty concerns issues central to America's national security. As such, the Senate should give the agreement careful scrutiny. But the debate over ratification should be based on the substance of the treaty, not groundless and misleading assertions.

*Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, is director of the Brookings Institution's Arms Control Initiative. Strobe Talbott, deputy secretary of state from 1994 to 2001, is president of Brookings.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/07/AR2010070703037.html>

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Washington Post  
OPINION

## **How New-START Will Improve Our Nation's Security**

By John F. Kerry  
Wednesday, July 7, 2010  
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Even in these polarized times, anyone seeking the presidency should know that the security of the United States is too important to be treated as fodder for political posturing. Sadly, former governor Mitt Romney failed that test in arguing that ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia would be a mistake [op-ed, July 6]. He disregarded the views of the best foreign policy thinkers of the past half-century, but more important, he ignored the facts.

No threat to our national security is greater than the danger from nuclear weapons. Responsible political figures across the spectrum need to support every step possible to control the spread of nuclear weapons. New START is one of those steps. This view is shared by most who have taken the time to understand the treaty and the

international context in which it was negotiated. Rather than pander to politics, we need to ratify this agreement quickly. Every day without its verification regime is a day without a clear view of Russia's nuclear arsenal.

From the first Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in April, Richard Lugar, the panel's ranking Republican, and I have made clear that there is no room in this debate for domestic politics. Serious people may differ over elements of the agreement, but after 10 hearings we have produced a public record that makes the case for ratification and rejects the narrow, uninformed political objections advanced by Romney.

Let's examine the key objections: Romney says that New START impedes our ability to build missile defenses against attack from rogue countries. This is a myth. The treaty will have no impact on our ability to build ballistic missile defenses against Iran, North Korea or other threats from other regions. The Obama administration is free to proceed with missile defense plans it announced last year.

Like others unfamiliar with previous arms control agreements, Romney warns that Russia could use language in the treaty's preamble as a pretext for withdrawal if the United States builds up its missile defense. In a word, baloney. The preamble is not legally binding. Every arms control treaty since the Kennedy administration has allowed either party to withdraw if it felt its national interests were jeopardized. Surely Romney would not want to give up that right.

Similarly, Romney is flat wrong in claiming that the Bilateral Consultative Commission is broadly empowered to amend the treaty with regard to missile defense. The language is clear that any amendment proposed by the commission would have to be ratified just like a new treaty.

Another red herring is the notion that the treaty allows Russia to escape limits on the number of strategic nuclear warheads. The same limits apply to the United States and Russia, including the ability to count each nuclear-equipped heavy bomber as a single warhead. The new treaty's approach to counting bomber weapons is consistent with the strategic relations between the United States and Russia and works to our advantage because our fleet has a great nuclear-weapons capacity.

Romney's claim that Russia can mount an unlimited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on bombers is a strategic concept that was rejected in the 1960s because submarine-launched missiles were deemed far more effective. If Russia were foolish enough to pursue this path, we could either get the new weapons incorporated in the treaty or withdraw. His argument that the treaty abandons limits on multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, known as MIRVs, is equally flawed; the Bush administration decided it did not care what missiles Russia retained when it negotiated the 2002 Moscow Treaty. Similarly, concerns about restrictions on converting launchers for ICBMs and those launched from submarines for missile defense purposes are misplaced because those conversions would be more expensive and less effective than alternatives and thus unnecessary.

New START will not constrain our ability to defend ourselves. On the contrary, it will improve our national security by reducing the number of nuclear weapons held by the United States and Russia, and by improving relations with our old adversary. Ratification will also show the international community that we are honoring our commitments on nonproliferation.

Many of the strongest voices for ratification are Republican. Henry Kissinger, national security adviser and secretary of state to presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, testified in May that the Senate should ratify the accord. He objected to injecting politics into such a momentous decision, saying, "It is, by definition, not a bipartisan, but a nonpartisan, challenge."

I have nothing against Massachusetts politicians running for president. But the world's most important elected office carries responsibilities, including the duty to check your facts even if you're in a footrace to the right against Sarah Palin. More than that, you need to understand that when it comes to nuclear danger, the nation's security is more important than scoring cheap political points.

*The writer, a Democrat from Massachusetts, is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/06/AR2010070603942.html>

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National Public Radio  
OPINION

## **National Review: Debate STARTed On Russian Treaty**

By Jim Talent  
July 8, 2010

*Jim Talent, a former member of both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, is now a Distinguished Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.*

The weaknesses of President Obama's New START treaty with Russia are finally starting to surface in Washington. On Monday, Mitt Romney weighed in against the treaty in a *Washington Post* column. The former Massachusetts governor raised concerns previously aired by Amb. John Bolton (in *National Review*), by the Heritage Foundation's Dr. Kim Holmes, and — in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee — by former undersecretaries of state and defense Bob Joseph and Eric Edelman.

Yesterday, Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.), reacted with a column that, after attacking Romney personally, merely ignored or dismissed (rather than disproved) Romney's objections.

First and foremost, Romney objected to START on the grounds that it would impede America's ability to complete a global ballistic-missile-defense system. The evidence supporting this concern is overwhelming. Article Five of the treaty explicitly prohibits the conversion of former ICBM silos to the purpose of missile defense; the Russians have publicly stated that the treaty limits America's discretion to complete ballistic-missile defense, and the preamble of the treaty explicitly links reductions in offensive capability to reductions in defensive systems.

Those who think the preamble unimportant should consider the words of Russian general Yevgeniy Buzinsky, chief of the International Treaty Directorate in the Russian Defense Ministry: "This [treaty language on missile defense in the preamble] makes it possible for us, in case the Americans increase their strategic ABM system, to claim that they are not observing the [terms] of the treaty."

Senator Kerry's response not only fails to answer these concerns, it actually lends credibility to them. Kerry states that the preamble to the treaty is not binding by itself and denies that the treaty "impedes our ability to build missile defense against attacks from rogue countries." He does not say that START would leave America free to construct a missile-defense system that could be used against Russian nuclear missiles.

And that's the crux of the matter. There is powerful evidence — especially in the context of the president's decision last year, at Russia's insistence, to abandon the Polish and Czech missile-defense bases — that the treaty reflects an agreement that the United States will not build a missile-defense system that could be used against Russia. The implications of that agreement go far beyond America's relationship with Russia, because it is impossible to build a robust missile defense against, for example, Iran, which could not also be used against Russian missiles. So to the extent that START limits missile defense against Russia, it must and will narrow the options we have to defend against Iran, and, for that matter, North Korea.

That is a key point that Romney and others are making. The Senate simply must demand a satisfactory answer. Ballistic-missile defense may be the most important defensive system the U.S. is building today. Even if the New START agreement were otherwise better than it is, the benefits would not come close to justifying any sacrifice in America's ability to defend itself against nuclear missiles.

Romney and other critics make several other points that Senator Kerry leaves effectively unrefuted:

1. Romney points out that START gives too much power to a "Bilateral Consultative Commission." It would be able to make unilateral changes in the treaty with regard to missile defense. Senator Kerry claims that the treaty requires any such change to be ratified by the Senate. Actually the treaty permits the commission to agree unilaterally on changes that are not substantive, but never defines what is or isn't substantive. Such ambiguity gives critics a right to be concerned. It would help if the White House would release the negotiating record of the treaty to clarify the meaning of provisions like this; but so far it has refused to do so.

2. Romney claims that the treaty favors the Russians in three important areas: It does not limit tactical nuclear weapons, which permits the Russians to retain their huge advantage in that area; its limits on launchers will require the U.S. to reduce its capabilities while letting the Russians increase theirs; and it permits the parties to put ICBMs on bombers and rail-based launchers. Kerry doesn't address the first two points, implicitly conceding them. On the last point, he ignores the issue with rail-based ICBMs (even though the Russians had rail-based ICBMs during the Cold War) and claims that if the Russians were "foolish" enough to put ICBMs on bombers, the U.S. could "get the new weapons incorporated in the treaty or withdraw" from the treaty. This argument concedes that, as critics claim, the treaty currently does not cover using bombers for ICBMs.

So far, supporters of START have acted as if the treaty were a kind of aspirational expression of the desire for a nuclear-free world, and that anyone who opposes it is an enemy of such a future. But no one should doubt that this START treaty, like its predecessors, will require real changes that will have a real impact on American security. The more the administration ignores or dismisses the concerns of critics, the clearer it is that the changes embodied in this treaty will not be for the better, and could be disastrous. As the case now stands, the Senate should vote against ratification.

Wall Street Journal  
OPINION

## The New Start Treaty: Time For A Careful Look

July 8, 2010

By JON KYL

Hearings to ratify the nuclear arms treaty with Russia known as New Start are now underway in the Senate. To win the 67 votes needed to ratify it, President Obama is going to have to do more than defend the provisions of this one document.

New Start, signed by the president in April, is more than a stand-alone treaty: It is an important element of Mr. Obama's overall plan for maintaining a credible U.S. nuclear capability. If the Obama administration was clearly articulating that our nuclear posture is going to be strong and properly resourced, most senators will likely view the treaty as relatively benign. But right now many are wary of ratifying it because the Obama administration is sending mixed signals on this serious issue.

The administration's recently published Nuclear Posture Review took some sensible positions. It reiterated the continuing importance of nuclear deterrence and of the protection the U.S. nuclear arsenal extends to our foreign friends. And it stressed that the U.S. should preserve the "triad" of land-based, sea-based and bomber-delivered nuclear weapons.

The problem is that Mr. Obama embraces ideas that contradict his own declared goals of nuclear deterrence, nonproliferation and modernization. He says all of his nuclear policies are rooted in his vision of a world with zero nuclear weapons, a world he claims would be more stable and less likely to suffer a nuclear war. But this position is not grounded in reality, and the policies that flow from it are dangerous and impractical.

One example is the president's support for a multilateral treaty that would lock the U.S. into a permanent, comprehensive nuclear test ban. Another is the administration's pledge to pursue, after New Start comes into force, yet another new treaty with Russia that would make significantly deeper reductions in nuclear forces. And then there's the guideline in the administration's Nuclear Posture Review that effectively limits the technical freedom of our military and scientific experts to consider new designs to update aging nuclear weapons. All this in the service of a utopian idea of nuclear zero.

Such is the context for the debate about New Start. The treaty's main purpose is to oblige Russia and the U.S. to make specified reductions in their nuclear arsenals. But Russia would be making the reductions for financial reasons anyway, so we've agreed to concede something for nothing. And, as the numbers of our nuclear weapons go down, the importance of modernization to improve the safety and reliability of our arsenal goes up. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently noted, the U.S. is "essentially the only nuclear power in the world that is not carrying out these kinds of modernization programs."

The nuclear weapons plan Mr. Obama submitted to Congress in May raises as many questions as it answers. Despite pledging over \$100 billion to maintain and modernize nuclear delivery systems, the plan makes a commitment only to a next-generation submarine—not to a next-generation bomber, ballistic missile, or air-launched cruise missile. The administration has also made no decision about whether or how it will replace the B-52 bomber, which first flew in 1952, and under current plans will continue to fly until possibly 2037. Nor does the White House intend to decide what the new U.S. nuclear force structure will look like until as many as seven years after the treaty is ratified.

The administration's plan for modernizing U.S. nuclear warheads and infrastructure is similarly sketchy. It claims funding of \$80 billion over 10 years, but that amount reflects double-counting of money that was going to be spent anyway merely to keep seriously aging weapons and equipment operational. What little new funds may be available under the president's plan will not cover even pressing needs like replacing two decrepit and dangerous facilities that produce plutonium and uranium. What's more, the administration's working budget documents for the next several years suggest that the modernization plan is underfunded by as much as \$2.4 billion.

The administration has a duty to provide resources to fund its plan. To its credit, it has been seeking funding for fiscal year 2011. A key test is whether the Democratic-controlled Congress will approve the president's nuclear modernization requests for the coming fiscal year. If the president's bare minimum budget is not funded, there will not be bipartisan confidence that the plan will be implemented. It's hard to see senators considering the treaty before

the fiscal year 2011 funding is appropriated and before they confirm that the 2012 budget will include adequate funding for the next fiscal year.

Senators will also have to assess the treaty itself, and there are serious concerns.

First, it's not clear that the treaty's verification provisions are adequate. Second, the treaty's failure to take into account Russia's enormous tactical nuclear weapons arsenal (more than 10 times larger than that of the U.S.) and the limitations it places on U.S. conventional global strike capabilities are serious flaws. Third, the treaty links missile defense to strategic arms reduction—a linkage that had been wisely broken by the Bush administration.

The administration accepted treaty language that will help the Russians argue that the U.S. should cut back development of defenses against ballistic missiles. This is worrisome less because of the explicit limitations on missile defense than because Mr. Obama has repeatedly shown weak support for U.S. missile defense. For this reason and others, senators have asked the administration to open up the negotiating record. They rightly want to understand what concessions the administration made and received.

The Senate should never be a rubber stamp in approving treaties, especially in the arms control field. In 1998, for example, the Senate rejected the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and effectively confirmed its role as quality control for treaty-making. My colleagues and I will be giving New Start and the administration's nuclear modernization plan a hard look.

*Mr. Kyl, a Republican, is a U.S. senator from Arizona.*

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704293604575343360850107760.html>

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Japan Times - Japan

OPINION

Thursday, July 8, 2010

## **A Losing Battle Against Proliferation**

By MICHAEL RICHARDSON

Slowly but surely, the barriers preventing the spread of nuclear technology and materials that can be used to make weapons of mass destruction are being eroded.

The most brazen cases involve North Korea and Iran. The former left the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), conducted at least two nuclear explosive tests in the past few years and has threatened to carry out more. Iran remains in the NPT but refuses to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations nuclear watchdog, and is widely suspected of seeking nuclear weapons.

However, less obvious pressures are also undermining nuclear arms control as both big and emerging powers seek strategic and commercial gains. China is planning to provide more nuclear power reactors and fuel to Pakistan, even though Pakistan refuses to join the NPT and accept rigorous IAEA surveillance of all its nuclear facilities. In a clear sign that the deal will proceed, two Chinese state-owned companies last month signed a contract to cooperate in building the reactors to generate electricity at Pakistan's Chasma atomic complex, advancing a program that worries the United States and India.

Washington and New Delhi can hardly be surprised. Their own agreement in 2005 to reopen civilian nuclear trade blew a hole in international arrangements to stop proliferation. The agreement with the U.S. was sealed despite India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998, which triggered follow-on tests by its longtime rival Pakistan.

A key part of the counter-proliferation system is the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) of 46 participating governments that between them control much of the knowhow, equipment and material needed for both civilian and military nuclear programs. They regulate the most powerful technology and fissile materials so far developed. Australia, which has about 40 percent of the world's commercially recoverable uranium resources, is a member of the informal cartel.

The NSG was established in 1975 to reinforce the NPT. Its voluntary guidelines were designed to prevent the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies and block nuclear commerce with states that did not observe basic nonproliferation standards. The NSG barred trade with non-NPT countries. India was one of only three states never to have signed the treaty. The others were Pakistan and Israel.

Yet in 2001, Russia, a prominent NSG member, sold uranium to India and agreed to build two additional reactors for India, without NSG approval.

Under U.S. pressure, but with strong backing from Russia, France and Britain, the NSG agreed in 2008 to exempt nuclear transfers to India. All India's backers sought closer ties with South Asia's leading power and wanted to cash in on India's expansion of its civilian nuclear power market worth about \$150 billion.

At least India had no record of transferring its nuclear knowhow abroad. Pakistan has been the source of clandestine nuclear weapons and missile technology transfers to North Korea, Iran and Libya. It is expanding its capacity to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons and has blocked the start of international negotiations on a treaty to ban production of fissile material for nuclear arms.

Yet since the NSG exemption granted to India, China has been seeking equal treatment for its ally Pakistan so that it can expand civilian nuclear power. Israel, too, has sought exemption. Both moves have been unsuccessful.

When China joined the NSG in 2004, it had already built a power reactor at Pakistan's Chasma site. Beijing said at the time it was entitled to build a second reactor because it was part of the original agreement with Islamabad. However, building a third and fourth reactors, as China plans to do, would be another major breach in NSG standards.

Even Japan, the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack, may be ready to bend its strict controls on nuclear exports. Japan and India held their first round of negotiations on a civilian nuclear pact at the end of last month.

As the nuclear power industry expands, particularly in Asia, Japan wants to compete with China and South Korea in lucrative nuclear exports. It is also under pressure from the U.S. and European countries whose nuclear companies have formed joint ventures with Japanese firms that are circumscribed by Tokyo's strict compliance with the NPT and NSG guidelines.

Hinting at new flexibility, Japan's trade minister, Masayuki Naoshima, said recently that India's use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes "has already been internationally accepted." The U.S., Russia, France and Canada have already signed nuclear cooperation agreements with India.

Australia has yet to indicate whether it, too, will shift ground and lift its ban on selling uranium to India.

At a meeting of the NSG in New Zealand last month, China sidestepped questions about its plan to sell Pakistan two additional reactors. The meeting also failed to agree on tougher guidelines on transfer of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technology.

Some emerging powers that are NSG members, including Brazil, South Africa and Turkey, fear that U.N. Security Council sanctions imposed on Iran by the U.S., Russia, China, France and Britain — the five big nuclear powers — may make it more difficult in future for them to enrich their own uranium for energy security and export.

More than 30 countries are planning to start nuclear power programs, doubling the number that already do so. Many are in Asia, the Middle East, South America and Africa.

Without strict international rules on nuclear trade, the technologies and materials that can be used to make weapons of mass destruction will become more widely available, triggering regional nuclear arms races and opening the door for terrorists to get the ultimate weapons of fear and blackmail.

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Washington Post

OPINION

## **Sanctions Alone Won't Work On Iran**

By Charles S. Robb and Charles Wald

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When President Obama signed into law tough, new legislative sanctions against Iran last week, he capped a month of new measures against that country's nuclear program. Earlier in June, the Obama administration achieved a new round of U.N. Security Council sanctions, and the European Union declared plans to adopt additional sanctions in July. This activity, the culmination of months of political and diplomatic negotiations, is welcome. Absent a broader and more robust strategy, however, sanctions alone will prove inadequate to halt Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Congress's Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act targets companies that sell, transport and insure gasoline to Iran, as well as financial institutions with ties to Iran's nuclear program. We agree that

ratcheting up pressure on Iran through all means available is essential. And yet, as CIA Director Leon Panetta recently conceded, these measures alone "probably" won't be enough to thwart Iranian nuclear ambitions.

Similarly, even many supporters of the new U.S. law acknowledge that without multilateral participation and enforcement, Iran will continue to evade many of these new U.S. restrictions and acquire gasoline, albeit at higher cost, from suppliers and middlemen beyond the reach of U.S. law. Indeed, the U.N. sanctions do not prohibit selling Iran gasoline.

Even if they could put enough pressure on Iran to force a policy change, sanctions require time to take effect. Yet as Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium grows, the time for stopping its nuclear program rapidly dwindles. As we wrote in our just-released Bipartisan Policy Center report on Iran, two scenarios become increasingly likely in the coming months:

First, current trends suggest that Iran could achieve nuclear weapons capability before the end of this year, posing a strategically untenable threat to the United States. Contrary to a growing number of voices in Washington, we do not believe a nuclear weapons-capable Iran could be contained. Instead, it would set off a proliferation cascade across the Middle East, and Iran would gain the ability to transfer nuclear materials to its terrorist allies. Meanwhile, even as it continued to threaten Israel's existence, Tehran would be able to dominate the energy-rich Persian Gulf, intensify its attempts to destabilize moderate Arab regimes, subvert U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, violently oppose the Middle East peace process, and increase support for terrorism across the region.

An Iran emboldened by nuclear weapons clearly might overstep its boundaries, pulling the Middle East and the United States into a treacherous conflict.

An even more likely scenario, however, is that Israel would first attack Iranian nuclear facilities, triggering retaliatory strikes by Iran and its terrorist proxies. This would put the United States in an extremely difficult position. If we remained neutral in such a conflict, it would only invigorate Tehran, antagonize our regional allies and lead to greater conflict. On the other extreme, the United States could be dragged into a major confrontation at a time not of its choosing.

With sanctions unlikely to be sufficient, a nuclear Iran strategically untenable and an Israeli strike extremely risky, we support a triple-track strategy that involves the simultaneous pursuit of diplomacy; sanctions; and visible, credible military readiness activity. This strategy is consistent with President Obama's 2009 pledge at Camp Lejeune, N.C., "to use all elements of American power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon."

We cannot afford to wait indefinitely to determine the effectiveness of diplomacy and sanctions. Sanctions can be effective only if coupled with open preparation for the military option as a last resort. Indeed, publicly playing down potential military options has weakened our leverage with Tehran, making a peaceful resolution less likely.

Instead, the administration needs to expand its approach and make clear to the Iranian regime and the American people: If diplomatic and economic pressures do not compel Iran to terminate its nuclear program, the U.S. military has the capability and is prepared to launch an effective, targeted strike on Tehran's nuclear and supporting military facilities.

Many who condemned the Bush administration's lack of transparency before the invasion of Iraq today discourage public discussion of military options concerning Iran. But we cannot afford to shirk this debate or dismiss it as warmongering; it is precisely a public recognition of a viable military option that could preclude its need.

We are not under any illusions: No risk-free solutions exist. Our triple-track strategy does not guarantee complete success. However, the likely alternatives are more alarming, with a perilous conflict involving a nuclear Iran becoming more probable each day. The stakes are too high to rely on sanctions and diplomacy without credibly preparing for a potential military strike as well. We cannot fall prey to the inertia of resignation. Bold U.S. leadership is required.

*Charles S. Robb, a former Democratic senator from Virginia, and Charles Wald, a retired general and air commander in the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, are co-authors of the Bipartisan Policy Center report "Meeting the Challenge: When Time Runs Out."*

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